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“Requiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters
1
civic courage, without which democracy is doomed.”
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the Federal Election Commission (FEC), candidates and
2
political groups spent roughly $7 billion during the 2012 general election.
Groups that were not required to disclose their donors to the federal government
3
were responsible for over $300 million of this spending. This marked a
considerable increase in the amount of dark money spent during a single election
4
cycle. Certain politicians and commentators have decried this phenomenon as
5
corrosive of the democratic process. Others have argued against expanding the
regulation of dark money, claiming that doing so would both hamper free speech
6
and serve particular partisan interests. With the enactment of Chapter 16, the
California legislature has taken a decidedly pro-disclosure approach to the issue
7
of dark money. This piece of legislation, which was introduced by Senator Lou
Correa, is intended to force groups contributing large amounts of money to
8
California political campaigns to disclose their financial backers.
1. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2837 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
2. Tarini Parti, $7 Billion Spent on 2012 Campaign, FEC Says, POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2013, 10:26 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/7-billion-spent-on-2012-campaign-fec-says-87051.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
3. Political Nonprofits, Summary, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/
nonprof_summ.php (last visited July 15, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
4. Id.; see also Tara Malloy, A New Transparency: How to Ensure Disclosure from “Mixed-Purpose”
Groups After Citizens United, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 425, 432 (2011) (noting that in the 2010 election, 501(c)
groups constituted 42% of independent spending, a significant increase from virtually no independent spending
in 2006).
5. Ann M. Ravel, Viewpoints: California Shined a Spotlight on Dark Money, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 2,
2014, http://www.sacbee.com/2014/05/04/6374467/viewpoints-california-shined-a.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); Amber Phillips, Harry Reid Says ‘Dark Money’ in Campaigns Threatens Democracy,
LAS VEGAS SUN, June 3, 2014, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2014/jun/03/harry-reid-says-dark-moneycampaigns-threatens-dem/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); George Skelton, ‘Dark’ Campaign Money
Needs a Little Light, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-cap-dark-money20140324-column.html#axzz2wtXIoHg9 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
6. Briefing Report: The Dark Side of Disclosure, CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE REPUBLICAN CAUCUS
(Mar. 14, 2012), http://cssrc.us/content/briefing-report-dark-side-disclosure (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) [hereinafter Republican Caucus Report].
7. See Press Release, Fair Political Practices Comm’n, Governor Signs Legislation to Close “Dark
Money” Loopholes (May 14, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter FPPC Press Release,
May 14, 2014] (describing Chapter 16’s effect on disclosure requirements for “non-profits and other MultiPurpose Organizations”); Editorial, Refreshing Developments: The Legislature Has Productive Week, FRESNO
BEE, May 17, 2014, http://www.fresnobee.com/2014/05/17/3931814/our-viewrefreshing-developments.html
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that “California has unmasked those secretive donors” by
passing Chapter 16”).
8. See SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 27, at 8 (May 7, 2014) (describing the
goals of SB 27, including preventing laundering of campaign funds through nonprofits and increasing the
accessibility of donor data).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Political Reform Act of 1974 (the Act) is the cornerstone of campaign
9
finance and reporting laws in California. The Act created the Fair Political
Practices Commission (FPPC) to promulgate regulations and enforce the
10
provisions of the Act, including reporting requirements for nonprofit
11
organizations. However, these laws did not require the disclosure of certain
12
contributions by nonprofit organizations. During the 2012 general election, the
ability of groups to make anonymous contributions proved to be a serious
impediment to the enforcement of California’s campaign finance disclosure
13
laws.
A. The Political Reform Act of 1974
Voters approved the Act, known at the time as Proposition 9, with a
14
sweeping 69.8% vote, in the 1974 midterm election. One of the fundamental
tenets of the Act was that “[p]ublic officials . . . should perform their duties in an
impartial manner, free from bias caused by . . . the financial interests of persons
15
who have supported them . . . .” In furtherance of this ideal, the Act established
a wide array of reform measures affecting such fundamental aspects of California
politics as the ballot initiative process, lobbying, and campaign finance and
16
disclosure requirements. To provide for the enforcement of political reform
17
laws, the Act created the FPPC and empowered the agency to develop and
18
enforce regulations in furtherance of the Act’s purposes.

9. History of the Political Reform Act, FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM’N, http://www.fppc.ca.gov/
index.php?id=57 (last visited June 19, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
10. Id.; CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 83100, 83112 (West 2005).
11. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, §§ 18215, 18412 (2014) (identifying nonprofit organizations that must
disclose their sources of funds and how the disclosure is to be carried out).
12. See infra Part II.B (discussing the ability of nonprofit organizations to make anonymous political
contributions in California).
13. See, e.g., Minute Order, Fair Political Practice Comm’n v. Americans for Responsible Leadership,
No. 34-2012-00131550-CU-PT-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2012), 2012 WL 5351247 [hereinafter Order
Granting Preliminary Injunction] (granting the FPPC a preliminary injunction to compel Americans for
Responsible Leadership to disclose its financial sources after the nonprofit organization claimed protection
under the one-bite rule, a feature of California disclosure law that allowed a group to make one anonymous
contribution if it had not made contributions in California in the past).
14. Roger Jon Diamond et al., California’s Political Reform Act: Greater Access to the Initiative Process,
7 SW. U. L. REV. 453, 454 (1975).
15. GOV’T § 81001(b).
16. Diamond et al., supra note 14, at 464–65.
17. GOV’T § 83100.
18. Id. § 83112.
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B. FPPC Regulation of Nonprofit Organizations Under the Act
19

Prior to Chapter 16, if a nonprofit organization made “contributions or
20
independent expenditures totaling $1,000 or more . . . to support or oppose a
candidate or ballot measure in California” the Act required the group to report
21
the source of the funds. When making such a disclosure, the group had to first
disclose donors who knew that the group would use the donations for political
22
purposes in California. If a donor had given money in response to a solicitation
that explicitly stated the organization’s intended political purpose, then the donor
23
was assumed to have known of the political use of the donation. Thus, the
24
organization had to disclose that donor’s identity.
If disclosure of all donors who knew that their payments would be used for
political purposes did not account for the full amount of the organization’s
contributions and expenditures, the organization had to broaden its disclosure by
reporting donors who “had ‘reason to know’ that all or part of their payments
25
would be used to make expenditures or contributions.” A donor was presumed
to have reason to know that his donation would be used for political purposes
only if the organization had “made expenditures or contributions of at least
$1,000 in the aggregate during the calendar year in which the payment occur[ed],
26
or any of the immediately preceding four calendar years.” The law required that
this type of disclosure be done in reverse-chronological order (beginning with the
most recent donations) until an amount equal to the organization’s contributions
27
and expenditures had been accounted for. If this method of disclosure still failed
to account for the remaining amount of contributions and expenditures, the
28
organization could list itself as the source of any remaining funds.

19. “A contribution is any payment made for political purposes for which full and adequate consideration
is not made to the donor.” 2 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18215(a) (2014). Political purposes include attempts to
influence voters as well as donations made in response to a request by a candidate, committee, political party, or
labor union. Id.
20. “An expenditure is any monetary or nonmonetary payment made for political purposes,” including
attempts to influence voters. Id. A payment is also made for political purposes if it is made by a candidate,
controlled committee, political party, or organization formed primarily for political purposes. Id. Further,
“‘[e]xpenditure’ includes any monetary or non-monetary payment . . . that is used for communications which
expressly advocate the nomination, election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate or candidates, or the
qualification, passage or defeat of a clearly identified ballot measure.” Id. § 18225(b).
21. Id. § 18412(a).
22. Id. § 18412(b).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 18412(a)–(b).
25. Id. § 18412(c)(1).
26. Id. § 18215(b)(1).
27. Id. § 18412(c)(1).
28. Id. § 18412(c)(2).
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C. The One-Bite Rule
29

One feature of this method of disclosure was the one-bite rule. Assuming
that an organization had not previously made a contribution or expenditure of
$1,000 or more in California or received money from donors who knew that their
funds would be used for political purposes, it could make a one-time contribution
30
or expenditure of any size without having to disclose any sources. This is
because a donor giving to an organization that had not spent $1,000 or more on
California politics was not presumed to have reason to know that his donation
31
would be spent on California politics. Thus, the organization would only need to
disclose donors who had either contributed in response to a politically oriented
solicitation or requested that their funds go toward political spending in
32
33
California —two criteria that are not readily apparent. Though the FPPC has
34
the ability to discover such information by conducting audits, organizations are
sometimes unwilling to divulge documents that might reveal their failure to
35
comply with FPPC regulations.
D. Fair Political Practices Commission v. Americans for Responsible
Leadership
In 2013, the FPPC brought an enforcement action against two nonprofit
36
organizations, resulting in the largest penalty in the history of the Act. This suit
stemmed from an earlier court battle in which the FPPC sought disclosure of the
sources of an $11 million payment made to influence voting on two California
37
ballot measures during the 2012 general election. The Center to Protect Patient
Rights (the Center), a nonprofit organization located in Phoenix, Arizona, made
payments totaling $18 million to Americans for Responsible Leadership (ARL),
38
another Arizona-based nonprofit organization. On the same day it received the
29. See KIM ALEXANDER, INITIATIVE DISCLOSURE REFORM: OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6
(2011) (describing the one-bite rule, also known as the one-bite-at-the-apple rule).
30. FPPC Press Release, May 14, 2014, supra note 7.
31. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18215(b)(1).
32. See Id. § 18412(b) (describing the situations in which a committee must disclose its donors).
33. See Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 13, at 1 (describing the lengths to which the
FPPC had to go to obtain information about American’s for Responsible Leadership’s $11 million donation to
the Small Business Action Committee PAC). The FPPC had to obtain an injunction in order to ascertain
whether ARL had met the criteria that would require it to disclose its financial sources. Id.
34. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 90003 (West 2005).
35. See Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 13, at 1 (ordering Americans for Responsible
Leadership to disclose its financial sources to the FPPC after it refused to do so in response to an FPPC audit).
36. Press Release, Fair Political Practices Comm’n, FPPC Announces Record Settlement in $11 Million
Arizona Contribution Case (Oct. 24, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter FPPC Press
Release, Oct. 24, 2013].
37. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 13, at 1.
38. Stipulation for Entry of Judgment at 3, 10, Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Americans for
Responsible Leadership, No. 34-2012-00131550-CU-PT-GDS, (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 2013) [hereinafter
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final payment from the Center, ARL made an $11 million payment to the Small
39
Business Action Committee-PAC (SBAC-PAC), a committee formed primarily
40
to oppose Proposition 30 and support Proposition 32. Under existing FPPC
regulations prohibiting contributions made on behalf of another party, the Center
41
was required to disclose itself to SBAC-PAC as the true source of the funds;
42
however, the Center made no such disclosure.
After receiving a complaint regarding the $11 million payment from ARL to
43
SBAC-PAC, the FPPC opened an investigation into ARL’s finances. ARL
refused to disclose the true source of the funds paid to SBAC-PAC because
“[t]here [was] no record of ARL making contributions in the State of California
44
prior to the contribution in question . . . .” Since it had not contributed $1,000 in
California during the current calendar year or any of the previous four calendar
years, ARL’s donors (including the Center) were presumed not to have reason to
know that the organization would use any donations to influence California
45
politics. Thus, ARL only needed to disclose donors who requested that their
donations be used for political purposes in California or whose donations were
46
expressly solicited for that purpose. To determine whether these criteria were
met, and thus whether ARL was required to file a campaign report disclosing its
source, the FPPC obtained a preliminary injunction in Sacramento County
47
Superior Court ordering ARL to comply with the FPPC audit. After a failed
48
attempt to appeal the trial court’s order, ARL disclosed that the Center had been
Settlement Agreement].
39. Id. at 10–11.
40. Id. at 8.
41. CAL GOV’T CODE § 84302 (West 2005) (prohibiting the making of “a contribution on behalf of
another, or while acting as the intermediary or agent of another, without disclosing to the recipient of the
contribution both his own full name and street address, occupation, and the name of his employer . . . .”).
42. Settlement Agreement, supra note 38, at 10–11.
43. Id. at 11. California Common Cause filed the complaint that initiated the investigation of ARL.
Telephone Interview with Sarah Swanbeck, Policy and Legislative Affairs Advocate, California Common
Cause (July 2, 2014) (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
44. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 13, at 1.
45. Id.; see CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18215(b)(1) (2014) (“There shall be a presumption that the donor
does not have reason to know that all or part of the payment will be used to make expenditures or contributions,
unless the person or organization has made expenditures or contributions of at least $1,000 in the aggregate
during the calendar year in which the payment occurs, or any of the immediately preceding four calendar
years.”)
46. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18215(b)(1) (2014) (defining “contribution” in a way that requires
disclosure of donors if the organization has made contributions or expenditures in California totaling $1,000 in
the current calendar year or previous four calendar years); see id. § 18412(a)–(c) (requiring nonprofit
organizations and out-of-state political committees to disclose contributions from donors who “request[] or
know[] that the payment will be used by the organization to make a contribution or an independent expenditure
to support or oppose a candidate or ballot measure in California . . . .”). Since ARL was not required to disclose
donors under § 18215(b)(1), it was only required to disclose donors under § 18412. See id. § 18412(c)(2)
(allowing organizations to attribute to themselves whatever donations are not accounted for under
sections 18215(b)(1) and 18412).
47. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 13, at 1.
48. Supreme Court Minutes, Fair Political Practice Comm’n v. Americans for Responsible Leadership,
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49

the true source of the funds donated to SBAC-PAC. The failure of the Center to
disclose itself to SBAC-PAC violated FPPC regulations against making political
50
contributions on another’s behalf. However, because of the protection offered
51
by the one-bite rule, this violation was difficult to bring to light. The day before
the November 6th election, ARL disclosed the Center and an organization known
52
as Americans for Job Security (AJS) as the true sources of the $11 million. The
FPPC later brought a civil action against ARL and the Center for their respective
53
violations, resulting in a record $1 million fine.
Though the ARL case was a clear victory for the FPPC, it became apparent
that existing campaign disclosure laws created a significant window for nonprofit
54
organizations to make anonymous political contributions in California. The
fines against ARL and the Center were actually based on the violation of law
against campaign money laundering, not those requiring the disclosure of
55
donors. Because the Center and AJS had not previously contributed money to
California politics, the FPPC could not require the organizations to disclose the
56
names of their donors under the one-bite rule. Thus, on Election Day in 2012,
California voters may have been aware that a series of undisclosed transactions
had occurred, but they did not know the identities of the individual donors behind
57
the funds in question. The law’s failure to require disclosure generated wide
58
support for the strengthening of campaign finance disclosure laws.

No. S206407 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 2012). The California Supreme Court vacated the Third District Court of
Appeal’s stay of the order compelling ARL to comply with the FPPC audit. Id.
49. Americans for Responsible Leadership Admits Campaign Money Laundering, Discloses $11 Million
Donor, FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM’N, http://www.fppc.ca.gov/index. php?id=346 (last visited June 17,
2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Settlement Agreement, supra note 38, at 11–12.
50. Settlement Agreement, supra note 38, at 14.
51. See id. at 11 (indicating that the FPPC opened a discretionary audit, initiated proceedings in state
court, and negotiated a settlement with ARL in order to compel the organization to disclose the Center as the
source of ARL’s political contributions).
52. FPPC Press Release, Oct. 24, 2013, supra note 36.
53. Id.
54. See Nicholas Confessore, Group Linked to Kochs Admits to Campaign Finance Violations, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/25/us/politics/group-linked-to-kochs-admits-tocampaign-finance-violations.html?_r=0 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that the fine
negotiated by the FPPC is “one of the largest penalties ever assessed on a political group for failing to disclose
donations”); ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 6 (“[I]f an entity is donating in a California election for the first
time, it is exempt from having to form a committee and is not required to disclose its donors.”).
55. Settlement Agreement, supra note 38, at 12–17.
56. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 13, at 1 (stating that there was no record of ARL
previously making a political payment in California); see also note 46 supra.
57. Skelton, supra note 5 (“No one still can say with certainty who actually forked out the millions, but
the secretive network of nonprofits had ties to right-wing billionaires Charles and David Koch. So virtually
everyone assumes it was the out-of-state Koch brothers who were secretly playing in California politics.”).
58. See, e.g., Letter from Melissa Mikesell, Alliance for Justice, to Mike Gatto, Chair, California State
Assembly Committee on Appropriations (Aug. 22, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (urging the
passage of SB 27); Skelton, supra note 5 (encouraging lawmakers to compromise in order to pass SB 27).
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III. CHAPTER 16
59

Chapter 16 expands upon the Political Reform Act of 1974 by
implementing heightened reporting requirements for both nonprofit
60
61
organizations and primarily formed committees, as well as increasing the
62
availability of information regarding campaign finance to voters.
A. Reporting Requirements for Multipurpose Organizations
Chapter 16 defines a previously undefined type of organization: the
63
multipurpose organization (MPO). MPOs include any “association or group of
persons acting in concert, that is operating for purposes other than making
64
contributions or expenditures.” This new category encompasses both nonprofit
65
organizations and political groups based outside of California. Perhaps most
importantly, it includes “social welfare organizations” created under section
66
501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code. If an MPO qualifies as a recipient
committee, a political organization that receives and distributes money for
67
68
political purposes, it will be subject to heightened reporting requirements.
Chapter 16 describes four possible situations when a multipurpose organization
69
qualifies as a recipient committee for purposes of the Act: (1) it spends $1,000
or more on political contributions and is registered out-of-state as a political
70
committee; (2) it solicits donations for the express purpose of making political

59. 2014 Cal. Stat. ch. 16, § 11 (finding that Chapter 16 “furthers the purposes of the Political Reform Act
of 1974”).
60. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84222 (enacted by Chapter 16).
61. Id. § 84223 (enacted by Chapter 16). A primarily formed committee is “[a] committee primarily
formed to support or oppose a state ballot measure or state candidate . . .” Id.
62. Id. § 88001 (amended by Chapter 16).
63. Id. § 84222(a) (enacted by Chapter 16).
64. Id. Specific examples of multipurpose organizations include religious, trade, professional, civic, and
fraternal organizations, educational institutions, out-of-state political organizations, and nonprofit organizations
falling under sections 501(c)(3)–(10) of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. Individuals, business entities, and
authorized candidate committees are not MPOs. Id.
65. Id. (stating that “a federal or out-of-state political organization” and “an organization described in
sections 501(c)(3) to 501(c)(10), inclusive, of the Internal Revenue Code” are both MPOs under Chapter 16).
66. Id. (defining MPOs to include “an organization described in sections 501(c)(3) to 501(c)(10),
inclusive, of the Internal Revenue Code”). 501(c)(4) organizations must maintain the promotion of social
welfare as their primary purpose. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2012). Such organizations do not need to disclose
their donors to the federal government. Donny Shaw, “Social Welfare” Groups Dominate Dark Money
Spending on Congressional Elections, MAPLIGHT, http://maplight.org/content/73410 (last visited July 13,
2014). See infra Part IV.A (discussing the role of 501(c)(4) organizations in the proliferation of anonymous
political contributions).
67. GOV’T § 84222(c) (enacted by Chapter 16).
68. Id. § 84222(d)–(e) (enacted by Chapter 16).
69. Id. § 84222(c) (enacted by Chapter 16).
70. Id. § 84222(c)(1) (enacted by Chapter 16); Id. § 82013 (West 2005) (setting a $1,000 threshold for
qualification as a recipient committee). Out-of-state political committees include those registered with the
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71

contributions and receives $1,000 or more; (3) it receives $1,000 or more from
72
donors who know that the funds will be used for political purposes; or (4) it
spends $50,000 during a twelve-month period or $100,000 over a period of four
73
years for political purposes.
MPOs that qualify as recipient committees must register with the California
Secretary of State and report the sources of any funds used to make political
74
contributions or expenditures in California. Qualifying MPOs must first report
75
all donors who earmark their contributions for political purposes. If this
reporting fails to account for all funds spent on contributions and expenditures in
California, then the multipurpose organization must disclose all donations of
$1,000 or more in reverse chronological order until an amount equal to its
76
contributions and expenditures is accounted for. This second method of
disclosure is carried out with no reference to whether the organization has made
77
political payments in the past. Organizations need not disclose donors who
78
affirmatively request that their donations not be used for political purposes.
B. Reporting Requirements for Primarily Formed Committees
Chapter 16 also sets new reporting requirements for committees formed
79
primarily to support or oppose a particular candidate or ballot measure. Any
such committee that raises $1 million or more must maintain a list of its ten
80
largest financial contributors and must submit the list to the FPPC for posting
81
on the FPPC web site. The committee must update the list any time there is a

Federal Election Commission (FEC) or in another state. Id. § 84222(c)(1) (enacted by Chapter 16).
71. Id. § 84222(c)(2) (enacted by Chapter 16); id. § 82013 (West 2005) (setting a $1,000 threshold for
qualification as a recipient committee).
72. Id. § 84222(c)(3) (enacted by Chapter 16). If a donor gives $1,000 or more to a multipurpose
organization and only later agrees that the funds may be used for contributions or expenditures, the
multipurpose organization will still be considered a recipient committee. Id. § 84222(c)(4) (enacted by Chapter
16); id. § 82013 (West 2005) (setting a $1,000 threshold for qualification as a recipient committee).
73. Id. § 84222(c)(5) (enacted by Chapter 16). The multipurpose organization will not be considered a
recipient committee if the contributions were made with nondonor funds, which include income from the
provision of services, sale of goods, and capital gains. Id. § 84222(c)(5)(A)–(B) (enacted by Chapter 16).
74. Id. § 84222(d)–(e) (enacted by Chapter 16). A multipurpose organization which qualifies as a
recipient committee because of its federal or out-of-state registration as a political committee is not required to
report information regarding its donors. Id. § 84222(d) (enacted by Chapter 16).
75. Id. § 84222(e)(1)(C) (enacted by Chapter 16). Only donors who have given a cumulative amount of
$100 or more must be disclosed. Id. § 84211(f) (West 2005).
76. Id. § 84222(e)(1)(C) (enacted by Chapter 16).
77. See id.§ 84222(c)(1)–(5) (enacted by Chapter 16) (making no reference to an organization’s past
contributions).
78. Id. § 84222(e)(2)(A)–(B) (enacted by Chapter 16).
79. Id. § 84223 (enacted by Chapter 16).
80. Id. § 84223(a) (enacted by Chapter 16). An organization need only include donors who have
contributed $10,000 or more. Id. § 84223(b)(4) (enacted by Chapter 16).
81. Id. § 84223(a), (c) (enacted by Chapter 16).
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82

83

change in the identity, relative ordering, or contribution level of any of the
84
committee’s ten largest donors. If one of the committee’s ten largest
contributors is itself a recipient committee, the FPPC can request that the list
85
identify that committee’s ten largest contributors as well. Committees must
86
make reasonable efforts to identify the actual sources of funds received.
C. Publication of Top Ten Lists
In addition to listing contributors to primarily formed committees, the FPPC
must “compile, maintain, and display on its Internet Web site a current list of the
87
top [ten] contributors supporting and opposing each state ballot measure . . . .”
In its official ballot pamphlet, the Secretary of State’s office must explain the
88
contributor lists and describe where voters may view the lists. All provisions of
89
Chapter 16 went into effect on July 1, 2014.
IV. ANALYSIS
Chapter 16 attempts to reduce the prevalence of anonymous political
90
payments in California elections. Part A examines the rise of dark money, both
in the State of California and in the United States generally. Part B explains the
current controversy surrounding dark money in politics. Part C discusses the
effects of Chapter 16 on dark money in California, particularly its elimination of
the one-bite rule. Part D describes some commentators’ reactions to Chapter 16.
A. The Rise of Dark Money
Anonymous contributions have regularly occurred in federal and California
91
elections. Until the passage of Chapter 16, California law permitted anonymous
contributions through the one-bite rule, a feature of the California Code of
92
Regulations; Federal law continues to allow anonymous contributions after a

82. Id. § 84223(c)(2)(A) (enacted by Chapter 16).
83. Id. § 84223(c)(2)(C) (enacted by Chapter 16).
84. Id. § 84223(c)(2)(B) (enacted by Chapter 16).
85. Id. § 84223(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 16).
86. Id. § 84223(d) (enacted by Chapter 16).
87. Id. § 84223(e) (enacted by Chapter 16).
88. Id. § 88001(m) (amended by Chapter 16); ELEC. § 9084(m) (amended by Chapter 16).
89. 2014 Cal. Stat. ch. 16, § 10.
90. Id. § 1(e).
91. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 7 (describing several anonymous contributions in recent
California ballot measure campaigns); Malloy, supra note 4, at 433.
92. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18215(b)(1) (2014) (requiring disclosure of the sources of a
contribution when the contributing entity has made political donations of $1,000 or more in the past).
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2007 decision by the FEC greatly expanded the ability of corporations and labor
93
unions to donate anonymously to political campaigns.
1. Dark Money in Federal Elections
Recent federal elections have seen a notable rise in anonymous political
94
spending by nonprofit organizations. This phenomenon is primarily attributable
to two recent changes in federal law: the 2007 amendment of title 11, section
104.20 of the Code of Federal Regulations and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010
95
ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.
The FEC is the governmental body responsible for promulgating and
96
enforcing regulations on federal election financing. In 2007, the FEC amended
the disclosure requirements for corporations and labor organizations that make
electioneering communications, which are media communications that clearly
97
identify a candidate for office and target the candidate’s electorate. Such
organizations must file a report that discloses the identity of any contributor who
gives $1,000 or more “for the purpose of furthering electioneering
98
communications.” Essentially, the contributor must earmark the payment to be
used toward a political communication in order for the recipient to be required to
99
disclose the identity of the contributor. This shift in campaign finance reporting
significantly narrowed the scope of donations that must be disclosed and resulted
in only a small percentage of the contributions behind electioneering
100
communications being reported to the FEC.

93. See Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The History of Undisclosed Spending in U.S. Elections &
How 2012 Became the “Dark Money” Election, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383, 453–54
(2013) (describing the FEC’s decision to narrow disclosure requirements for corporations and labor unions);
FED. ELECTION COMM’N, MINUTES OF AN OPEN MEETING OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 4 (Nov. 20,
2007), available at http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2007/approve07-79.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(narrowing the scope of when a party making an electioneering communication must disclose the sources of its
funds).
94. Malloy, supra note 4, at 433. “In 2006, only about 1% of independent spending in the election was
undisclosed; by contrast, in 2010, approximately 47% of all independent electoral spending was made through
groups that did not disclose their donors.” Id.
95. Id. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n held unconstitutional a federal statute limiting the
amount that corporations may spend on independent expenditures and electioneering communications. 130 S.
Ct. 876, 896–99 (2010).
96. About the FEC, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/about.shtml (last visited July 12, 2014)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
97. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, supra note 93; Potter & Morgan, supra note 93, at 453–54; Malloy, supra
note 4, at 437. An electioneering communication is “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that . . .
[r]efers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office . . . [i]s publicly distributed within 60 days before a
general election . . . or within 30 days before a primary . . . and . . . [i]s targeted to the relevant electorate.” 11
C.F.R. § 100.29(a)(1)–(3) (2014).
98. 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (2014).
99. Malloy, supra note 4, at 437–48.
100. Potter & Morgan, supra note 93, at 457. “In 2010, persons (including corporations and unions)
disclosed the sources of the funds used to air electioneering communications for less than ten percent of the
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Another reason for the rise of dark money in federal elections was the 2010
101
case Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission. The Supreme Court
ruled that the federal statute prohibiting corporations from making independent
expenditures and electioneering communications from their general treasuries
102
was unconstitutional. Accordingly, corporations no longer needed to make
political expenditures through PACs, but could make them through nonprofit
103
organizations as well. Until Citizens United, “non-profit corporations were . . .
barred from using treasury funds to make campaign-related contributions or
expenditures unless . . . they did not accept contributions from business
104
corporations or unions.” Citizens United eliminated this constraint on the
political activities of nonprofit organizations, allowing them to receive limitless
contributions from business corporations while continuing to make political
105
payments directly from their general treasuries.
The ability of corporations and nonprofit organizations to make unlimited
expenditures with limited donor disclosure requirements creates a golden
106
opportunity for donors to make anonymous contributions. By contributing to a
nonprofit organization without earmarking the donation for a specific political
107
purpose, a donor can easily evade disclosure. Under Citizens United, the
nonprofit organization is then free to use the donation to make political
108
expenditures, so long as political expenditures on behalf of candidates do not
109
become the organization’s primary purpose. There is no consensus on when
candidate-based election spending becomes an organization’s primary purpose,
but some experts argue that an organization can contribute 49.9% of its budget to
110
candidates while still maintaining its 501(c)(4) status. A nonprofit organization
can be set up with an ambiguous name that does not reveal the true identity of its
111
backers nor the organization’s actual intentions. Donors can then use the
total $79.9 million spent during that election cycle on such communications.” Id.
101. Malloy, supra note 4, at 427–29.
102. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (invalidating 2 U.S.C. §
441(b) as an unconstitutional prohibition of speech by a particular class of speakers).
103. Malloy, supra note 4, at 428–29.
104. Id. at 430 n.22.
105. Potter & Morgan, supra note 93, at 458; Malloy, supra note 4, at 427–29.
106. Potter & Morgan, supra note 93, at 477–78.
107. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Safeguarding Markets from Pernicious Pay to Play: A Model Explaining
Why the SEC Regulates Money in Politics, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 361, 394–95 (2013).
108. Malloy, supra note 4, at 430 n.22.
109. Organizations created under § 501(c)(4) must make social welfare their primary purpose. 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(4)(A) (2012). Political expenses on behalf of candidates are not considered to be in furtherance of
social welfare. 26 C.F.R § 1.501(c)(4)(a)(2)(ii) (2013).
110. Paul Blumenthal, What You Need to Know About the Obama Administration’s Proposed ‘Dark
Money’ Rules, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 27, 2013, 4:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/27/darkmoney_n_4351186.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
111. See Interest Group Advertising Pours into Senate Races, WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT,
http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/2014/04/29/interest-group-advertising-pours-into-senate-races/ (last visited
July 13, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (observing that ads are effective “especially . . . when
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resulting “shell” organization as a vehicle for channeling political funds, while
112
remaining anonymous themselves.
Following these developments, the nonprofit organization quickly became
113
the predominant entity for the disbursement of political funds. Powerful interest
groups established 501(c) affiliates to accommodate backers who wished to
114
remain anonymous. Political contributions by 501(c) organizations grew from
115
nearly nothing in 2006 to over 40% of all independent spending in 2010. Social
welfare organizations created under 501(c)(4) “increased spending on
116
congressional elections from $84 million in 2010 to $133 million in 2012.”
Early data on the 2014 midterm election has shown that 59% of television
advertisements for U.S. Senate races are funded by outside political groups and
59% of these groups are 501(c) organizations that do not report the sources of
117
their funds. Consequently, over one-third of the advertisements currently aired
118
concerning senatorial candidates are paid for anonymously. Since 2007, an
extensive system of nonprofit organizations has come into existence, exerting an
119
unprecedented level of anonymous influence on political races in the U.S.
2. Dark Money in California Elections
Dark money has appeared in California elections in recent years, although
120
resulting from a different set of disclosure laws. Under the one-bite rule, a
nonprofit or out-of-state political organization may make political contributions
without disclosing its donors if it has not made political contributions in

people know very little about the group except that it has a nice name”). Studies show that voters are actually
more accepting of advertisements paid for by organizations than those funded by candidates. Id.
112. Potter & Morgan, supra note 93, at 461–62.
113. See Malloy, supra note 4, at 432–33 (“In the 2006 midterm election 501(c) groups conducted
virtually no independent spending, whereas in 2010, 501(c) groups accounted for approximately 42% of
independent spending. Indeed, in 2010, the largest two spenders were the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a
501(c)(6) group, and American Action Network, a 501(c)(4) group, spending $32.9 and $26.1 million
respectively.”).
114. See, e.g., Potter & Morgan, supra note 93, at 463–64 (describing Karl Rove’s creation of Crossroads
GPS, a 501(c)(4) spin off of his American Crossroads super PAC). “Democrats took advantage of this dualentity strategy as well, forming the pro-Obama super PAC Priorities USA Action and creating a 501(c)(4)
counterpart, Priorities USA.” Id. at 464.
115. Malloy, supra note 4, at 432.
116. Shaw, supra note 66.
117. Interest Group Advertising Pours into Senate Races, supra note 111.
118. See id. (stating that 59% of current advertisements for U.S. Senate races are paid for by outside
groups, and 59% of these groups do not disclose their donors’ identities). Thus, 34.81% of advertisements in
Senate races are paid for anonymously. Id.
119. See Malloy, supra note 4, at 457–58 (“[C]itizens must now . . . contend with . . . an unprecedented
lack of transparency in federal elections . . . .”).
120. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 7 (describing several anonymous contributions in recent
California ballot measure campaigns).
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California in the past and the funds that it receives are not earmarked for political
121
purposes.
This rule has allowed for millions of dollars to be spent on anonymous
122
political contributions in the state. For example, Proposition 23, a 2010 ballot
measure, would have overturned legislation requiring a statewide reduction in
123
greenhouse gas emissions. Groups, including several 501(c) organizations,
spent over $36 million on campaigns to support and oppose Proposition 23, and
124
much of this money was contributed anonymously. This is because certain
groups that spent money for or against Proposition 23 were “first-time major
donors,” and such groups did not need to disclose their financial sources under
125
the one-bite rule. The existence of dark money in California elections received
increased public attention during the 2012 general election when the FPPC
126
brought its enforcement action against ARL.
The influence of 501(c)(4) “social welfare” organizations in California is
broadened by the fact that the IRS does not consider expenditures on ballot
127
measure campaigns to be political spending. In order to maintain its 501(c)(4)
status, an organization must be “operated exclusively for the promotion of social
128
welfare.” “[S]ocial welfare does not include direct or indirect participation or
intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate
129
for public office.” Conspicuously absent from this limitation on the activities of
501(c)(4) organizations is the provision of funds to support ballot measure
130
campaigns. Furthermore, a 501(c)(4) organization can maintain its nonprofit
status so long as political spending on candidate races does not become the

121. See supra Part II.C (discussing the one-bite rule in depth).
122. See ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 7 (listing contributors to Proposition 23 in 2010, including $3
million of spending by the National Wildlife Federation, for which no donors were reported).
123. CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, PROPOSITION 23: OFFICIAL TITLE AND SUMMARY (2010),
available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2010/general/pdf/english/23-title-summ-analysis.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
124. ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 7.
125. Id. The Adam Smith Foundation spent $498,000 to support Proposition 23, and the group did not
need to report its donors. California Prop. 23—Campaign Contributions—Nov. 2010, MAPLIGHT,
http://maplight.org/content/california-prop-23-nov-2010 (last updated Nov. 4, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review). The National Wildlife Federation spent $3 million opposing the measure and was not required to
report either. Id.
126. See, e.g., Kevin Yamamura, FCCP Says Arizona Nonprofit Laundered Money to CA Campaign,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 5, 2012, http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2012/11/fppc-accuses-arizonanonprofit-of-money-laundering.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the events of the
ARL case as they unfolded shortly before the 2012 election).
127. Ballot Measure Money Not Political Under IRS Loophole, NEWS10.NET (Nov. 11, 2013, 5:34 PM),
http://www.news10.net/ news/article/262992/2/Ballot-measure-money-not-political-under-IRS-loophole (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
128. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2012).
129. 26 C.F.R § 1.501(c)(4)(a)(2)(ii) (2013).
130. See id. (referring only to contributions “on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate” when setting
limitations on what 501(c)(4) groups may do).
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131

organization’s primary purpose. This feature of the law allows social welfare
groups to offset their “political” spending (on races for elective office) by simply
132
spending a slightly greater amount on ballot measure races. Thus, 501(c)(4)
groups can devote all of their resources to political purposes while still
133
withholding the identities of their backers. This effect is especially pronounced
in California where ballot measures play a greater role than in any other state in
134
the nation.
The $11 million that ARL and the Center spent toward two California ballot
measures is an example of how the rise of dark money on the national stage has
135
had a direct impact on California elections. The donation originated from the
136
Center, an organization at the hub of the network of nonprofit organizations
137
tied to David and Charles Koch. The Koch Brothers’ network is comprised of
nonprofit organizations, including the Center, Americans for Job Security, and
138
America Future Fund, none of which disclose their financial backers. The Koch
network raised and spent approximately $407 million during the 2012 election
139
cycle, making it one of the largest sources of political money in the nation.
Thus, the $11 million spent to influence voting in California was inextricably tied
140
to the larger phenomenon of dark money in federal elections across the country.
The numerous 501(c)(4) organizations that were established to take advantage of
a particular feature of federal law could, by exploiting the one-bite rule, focus
141
their influence on California elections.
131. Potter & Morgan, supra note 93, at 465 (stating that the U.S Department of the Treasury has created
the primary purpose test to determine whether 501(c)(4) organizations are operating to promote social welfare).
132. Ballot Measure Money Not Political Under IRS Loophole, supra note 127.
133. See id. (explaining how an IRS loophole allows nonprofit social welfare groups to spend 100% of
their funds on politics by ensuring that slightly more is spent on ballot measures than candidates); supra Part
II.C (explaining the one-bite rule that allows nonprofits to withhold the names of their donors).
134. Ballot Measure Money Not Political Under IRS Loophole, supra note 127.
135. See supra Part II.D (explaining how ARL and the Center were able to keep the sources of the
$11million contribution secret).
136. Letter from Kirk Adams, President, Americans for Responsible Leadership, to James V. Lacy,
Treasurer, Small Business Action Committee PAC (Nov. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
137. Viveca Novak, Americans for Responsible Leadership Wholly Funded by Koch-Linked Group,
OPENSECRETS.ORG (Dec. 13, 2013), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/12/americans-for-responsibleleadership-wholly-funded-by-koch-linked-group/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Confessore, supra
note 54 (including a chart of the Koch Brothers’ nonprofit network, in which the Center plays a central role).
138. Confessore, supra note 54.
139. Matea Gold, Koch-Backed Political Network, Built to Shield Donors, Raised $400 Million in 2012
Elections, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/koch-backed-political-networkbuilt-to-shield-donors-raised-400-million-in-2012-elections/2014/01/05/9e7cfd9a-719b-11e3-938909ef9944065e_story.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
140. See Letter from Kirk Adams, supra note 136 (noting that the Center was the source of the $11
million contribution to influence two California ballot measure races); Confessore, supra note 54 (stating that
the Center is an integral part of the Koch Brothers’ nationwide network of nonprofit organizations).
141. See Potter & Morgan, supra note 93, at 462–63 (describing how interest groups have formed
501(c)(4) groups to make anonymous political contributions in various U.S. elections); Laurel Rosenhall,
California FPPC Issues Record Fine for Failure to Disclose Source of Mystery Money, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct.
24, 2013, http://www.sacbee.com/2013/10/24/5850790/california-fppc-issues-record.html (on file with the
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B. Dark Money: Liberty or Liability?
Opponents of anonymous political contributions and expenditures argue that
142
such payments are detrimental to the transparency that should exist in elections.
The disclosure of political donors has the ability to educate voters about who is
advocating a certain position, allowing voters to more fully evaluate political
143
viewpoints. Further, all campaign finance rules, even those not related to
144
disclosure itself, are more easily enforced if donations are openly reported.
The U.S. Supreme Court has expressed its support for disclosure on multiple
145
occasions. In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy displayed strong support of
disclosure requirements, stating “[t]he First Amendment protects political
speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of
146
corporate entities in a proper way.” Referring to the practice of disclosing the
identity of donors, Justice Brandeis famously stated that “[s]unlight is said to be
147
the best of disinfectants . . . .” In the post-Citizens United world, disclosure is
148
gaining traction as a tool to limit the influence of money in politics.
However, supporters of anonymous contributions claim that anonymity is
part of the freedoms of speech and association guaranteed by the First
149
Amendment. They argue that disclosure has a chilling effect on political
150
151
contributions, which are a form of constitutionally protected speech.
McGeorge Law Review) (explaining how the Center and ARL utilized the one-bite rule to make an anonymous
donation in California).
142. See, e.g., Ravel, supra note 5 (“Dark money undermines trust in elections and contributes to
disengagement from government.”).
143. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–67 (1976) (“[Disclosure] allows voters to place each candidate in
the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign
speeches”); Ravel, supra note 5.
144. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67–68; see also Settlement Agreement, supra note 38, at 12 (“In general, failure
to disclose the true source of contributors deprives the public of important knowledge about who is funding
campaigns and how it impacts the campaign messages they receive.”). It was not at first apparent that ARL was
violating rules against campaign money laundering because the organization was claiming the right not to
disclose its sources under the one-bite rule. Id.. ARL’s and the Center’s violations of anti-laundering rules were
eventually uncovered, but only after a hard-fought court battle. Id. at 11–12.
145. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67–68 (stating that disclosure “aid[s] the voters in evaluating those who seek
federal office”); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (“[P]rompt disclosure of
expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected
officials accountable for their positions and supporters.”).
146. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
147. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (Frederick A.
Stokes Co. 2nd prtg. 1914) (1913).
148. See Adam Liptak, A Blockbuster Case Yields an Unexpected Result, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/us/disclosure-may-be-real-legacy-of-citizens-unitedcase.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (highlighting
the disclosure requirements upheld in Citizens United).
149. MonicaYoun, Proposition 8 and the Mormon Church: A Case Study in Donor Disclosure, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 2108, 2132 (2013).
150. Id. at 2110.
151. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
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Contributors may fear the consequences of public disapproval resulting from the
152
disclosure of their political contributions. For example, on April 3, 2014,
Brendan Eich, the CEO and cofounder of Mozilla, resigned his position with the
tech company in response to public outcry over his $1,000 contribution in
support of Proposition 8, the 2008 California ballot initiative to prohibit gay
153
marriage. Other supporters of the controversial measure have reported negative
reactions stemming from the disclosure of their donations to the “Yes on 8”
154
campaign, including boycotts and death threats. Additionally, there is concern
that the complexity of reporting forms and deadlines serves to discourage
organizations from political participation because of the possibility of
155
inadvertently violating disclosure laws.
C. Chapter 16: Reducing Dark Money and Increasing the Availability of
Campaign Finance Information
Chapter 16 will limit the amount of dark money spent in California elections
156
by eliminating anonymous contributions by MPOs under the one-bite rule and
157
requiring the publication of new types of data regarding political contributions.
1. Elimination of the One-Bite Rule
Chapter 16 adds section 84222 to the Government Code, which effectively
ends the reporting loophole that allowed one-time anonymous contributions in
158
California. Section 84222 requires that if an MPO spends a certain amount of
money on California politics, then that organization must report the sources of
159
the funds spent. The new law requires qualifying MPOs to disclose their
sources, regardless of whether the organization has made political contributions

152. See Youn, supra note 149, at 2126–28 (detailing the public backlash against supporters of
California’s Proposition 8 in 2008).
153. FAQ on CEO Resignation, MOZILLA BLOG (Apr. 5, 2014), https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2014/04/
05/faq-on-ceo-resignation/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
154. Youn, supra note 149, at 2126–28.
155. Mikesell, supra note 58; E-mail from Nayantara Mehta, Senior Counsel, Alliance for Justice, to Hyla
Wagner, Senior Staff Counsel, Fair Political Practices Comm’n (June 17, 2014, 8:50 AM), available at
http://fppc.ca.gov/IPmeetings/2014/20140617_IP_Meeting_Comment_Letters2.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (urging the FPPC to enact regulations that do “not unduly burden legitimate nonprofit
multipurpose organizations influencing ballot measures in California”).
156. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84222(c)(5), (e) (enacted by Chapter 16) (requiring MPOs to disclose their
sources after making any political contributions totaling $50,000 in one year or $100,000 in four years).
157. See id. § 84223 (enacted by Chapter 16) (requiring the FPPC to publish a list of the top ten
contributors to each committee formed primarily to support or oppose a ballot measure or candidate).
158. See id. § 84222(c)(5), (e) (enacted by Chapter 16) (requiring MPOs to report the names of donors if
the organization makes political payments totaling $50,000 in a single year, regardless of whether the
organization had made any political payments in California in the past).
159. Id. § 84222(c)(5), (e) (enacted by Chapter 16).

351

2014 / Government
160

in the past. This is a dramatic shift from prior law, which protected a donor’s
identity if the recipient organization had not made prior political contributions in
161
California. Under Chapter 16, an organization may only avoid disclosing
individual donors by affirmatively showing that a donor did not intend his
162
contribution to be used for political purposes. Thus, Chapter 16 shifts the
burden of proof from the government to MPOs: rather than the FPPC having to
compel disclosure by proving a donor’s knowledge of an organization’s political
purposes, the MPO must prove the donor’s lack of such knowledge in order to
163
avoid disclosure. Chapter 16 requires expanded disclosure by MPOs and
164
eliminates the one-bite rule.
2. Greater Availability of Campaign Finance Information
Chapter 16 also contains provisions to provide voters with more information
165
regarding the financing of campaigns in California. The top ten donor lists that
recipient committees must submit will serve as an easily digestible format
through which voters can learn which interests are supporting a given candidate
166
or ballot measure. Though campaign finance information was already available
167
to the public online, this information was voluminous and difficult for the lay
168
voter to interpret quickly. The top ten lists condense the most important
169
information into a simple list. They will be available online, and the Secretary
of State’s official ballot pamphlet will inform voters as to where the lists may be
170
accessed. This feature of Chapter 16 will ensure that the information disclosed
160. See id. (requiring the disclosure of donors once an MPO makes political payments totaling $50,000
in one year, or $100,000 in a period of four years).
161. Compare CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18215(b)(1) (2014) (requiring organizations to disclose donors
only if the organization had made prior political payments in California or the donor had earmarked the
contribution) with GOV’T § 84222(c)(5), (e) (enacted by Chapter 16) (requiring the disclosure of donors to any
MPO that spends $50,000 in a single year on California politics).
162. GOV’T § 84222(e)(2)(A)–(B) (enacted by Chapter 16) (creating an exception that MPOs need not
disclose donors who specifically request that their contributions not be used for making political expenditures or
contributions).
163. See id. § 84222(c)(5), (e) (enacted by Chapter 16) (requiring the disclosure of donors to any MPO
that spends $50,000 in a single year on California politics but creating an exception for donors who specifically
request that their contributions not be used for making political expenditures or contributions).
164. See id. (enacted by Chapter 16) (creating a presumption that will no longer allow MPOs to resist
disclosure by arguing that it had not made political payments in California in the past).
165. See Id. § 84223 (enacted by Chapter 16) (requiring primarily formed committees to report their top
ten donors for publication by the FPPC); id. § 88001(m) (amended by Chapter 16) (requiring the California
Secretary of State to publish information on the top ten lists in the official state ballot pamphlet).
166. Telephone Interview with Kim Alexander, President and Founder, California Voter Foundation (July
1, 2014) (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
167. Raw Data for Campaign Finance and Lobbying Activity, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.
ca.gov/prd/cal-access/ (last visited July 13, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
168. Interview with Kim Alexander, supra note 166.
169. Id.
170. GOV’T § 84223 (enacted by Chapter 16); id. § 88001(m) (amended by Chapter 16).
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will be available and comprehensible to voters who want to learn about a
171
campaign’s financial supporters.
D. Reactions to Chapter 16
Various groups active in California politics have expressed that the
172
elimination of the one-bite rule will be beneficial for California elections.
Supporters believe that the law closes a loophole in California’s disclosure
requirements and will prevent organizations from making anonymous
173
contributions in the state. Supporters of Chapter 16 see the abandonment of the
174
one-bite rule as a move toward greater transparency in elections.
Opponents of Chapter 16 claim that it is unnecessary in a state that already
175
has an “expansive and onerous” system of campaign finance rules. A report by
the California Senate Republican Caucus also claims that political operatives can
use the information that comes from disclosure for the purpose of harassing
176
donors. The specter of retribution has and continues to be one of the primary
177
rationales for political anonymity. However the Senate Republican Caucus
offers a more pragmatic basis for opposing the requirements of Chapter 16: it is
more likely to have an adverse effect on business interests than on labor unions
178
and other typically left-leaning groups.
V. CONCLUSION
Chapter 16 marks a significant shift in campaign finance disclosure
179
requirements in the State of California. Groups making large contributions to
171. Interview with Kim Alexander, supra note 166.
172. See ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 6 (stating that the one-bite rule is “[t]he primary obstacle to full
disclosure of all funders in initiative campaigns . . . .”); interview with Sarah Swanbeck, supra note 43.
173. FPPC Press Release, May 14, 2014, supra note 7; Interview with Sarah Swanbeck, supra note 43;
Refreshing Developments: The Legislature Has Productive Week, supra note 7 (“With SB 27, California has
unmasked those secretive donors.”).
174. Chris Carson, California League Wins Fight Against Dark Money in California, SAN DIEGO FREE
PRESS, June 14, 2014, http://sandiegofreepress.org/2014/06/california-league-wins-fight-against-dark-moneyin-california/#.U8O98_ldWSq (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Interview with Sarah Swanbeck, supra
note 43.
175. Republican Caucus Report, supra note 6.
176. Id.
177. See NAACP v Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (holding that the NAACP was not required to
disclose lists of its members, for fear of retribution by segregationists); Thomas B. Edsall, In Defense of
Anonymous Political Giving, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/opinion/edsallin-defense-of-anonymous-political-giving.html?_r=0 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting Koch
Industries spokesman Rob Tappan: “The rationale behind donor anonymity, which is a form of First
Amendment speech, is to protect against the threat of retaliation when someone or some group takes a stand,
espouses their point of view or articulates a position on issues that may (or may not) be popular with the general
public or the political party in majority power.”).
178. Republican Caucus Report, supra note 6.
179. Compare CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18215(b)(1) (2014) (requiring organizations to disclose donors

353

2014 / Government
California politics will no longer be able to utilize the one-bite rule to avoid
180
disclosing their financial sources. While there are currently no signs that the
181
FEC intends to restrict the availability of dark money in federal elections, the
California legislature has taken a markedly different position toward the presence
182
of dark money in the State of California. Given the ever-increasing prevalence
of dark money in the United States, the success or failure of the policies enacted
by Chapter 16 could help to inform the larger debate on anonymous political
183
contributions.
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